Languages, Algorithms, Procedures, Calculi, and Metalogic by Burgin, Mark
 
Languages, Algorithms, Procedures, Calculi and 
Metalogic 
 
Mark Burgin  
Department of Mathematics 
University of California, Los Angeles 
405 Hilgard Ave. 
Los Angeles, CA 90095 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
 Logicians study and apply a multiplicity of various logical systems. Consequently, 
there is necessity to build foundations and common grounds for all these systems. This 
is done in metalogic. Like metamathematics studies formalized mathematical theories, 
metalogic studies theories in logic, or logics. The discipline of logic has been 
developed with the aim to model and study human thinking and reasoning. A more 
realistic understanding relates logic only to reasoning. Reasoning is a mental and 
verbal activity. Any activity is based on actions and operations organized by 
procedures and algorithms. That is why procedures and algorithms are basic for the 
development of different logics, their study and application. In this work, we study 
structures used in logic with the aim to reflect goals of logic as a discipline. The main 
structure is a logical calculus, which pivotal for the contemporary logic. Logical 
calculus is considered here as a two-tier construction with a logical language on the 
first level and the calculus itself on the second level. A system of interdependencies 
that exists between properties of deductive calculi and utilized by these calculi 
algorithms are explicated and studied. Here only syntactic parts of logics, namely, 
deductive logical calculi and corresponding languages are considered. Semantic and 
pragmatic parts are studied elsewhere. 
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1. Introduction 
Languages are created and used for communication. Procedures and algorithms are 
created and used for action and transformation. Calculi combine languages, procedures 
and algorithms to provide means for derivation and generation of new entities from 
existing ones. 
The word calculus has two meanings in mathematics. The most popular in general 
mathematics understanding is that Calculus is a name that is now used to denote the 
field of mathematics that studies properties of functions, curves, and surfaces. As this 
is the most popular meaning in mathematics, we call it the calculus. It is usually 
subdivided into two parts: differential calculus and integral calculus. The main tool of 
the calculus is operating with functions to study properties of these functions. This 
operation can be regarded as a generalized calculation with these functions. This 
explains the name calculus used for this field, which originated from the Latin word 
meaning pebble because people many years ago used pebbles to count and do 
arithmetical calculations. The Romans used calculos subducere for "to calculate."  
Thus, the calculus is called so because it provides analytic, algebra-like 
techniques, or means of computing, which apply algorithmically to various functions 
and curves. Many mathematical problems that had very hard solutions or even such 
problems that mathematicians had not been able to solve, after the calculus had been 
developed, became easily solvable by mathematics students.  
Later the calculus developed into analysis, or mathematical analysis. There are 
also other calculi in analysis, for instance, operational calculus and calculus of 
variations. 
Another mathematical meaning of the word calculus comes from mathematical 
logic where calculus is a formal system used for logical modeling of mathematical 
and scientific theories. A logical calculus consists of three parts: axioms, rules of 
deduction (inference), and theorems (cf. (Kleene, 2002; Mendelson, 1997).  
The idea of the concept of logical calculus comes from Leibniz, who also 
introduced names differential calculus and integral calculus. He wrote that in future 
informal and vague arguments of philosophers would be changes for formal and exact 
calculations with formulas. Such calculations would allow one to find who of those 
philosophers was right and who was wrong. 
To make such generalized calculations with formulas, people use definite rules. 
Systems of rules form algorithms when they are precise, exactly realizable and 
sufficiently simple to be performed by a mechanical device. Otherwise, such systems 
are called procedures. 
 Generalized calculations are performed with symbolic expressions, which are 
elements of definite languages, usually, formal languages. The goal of this work is to 
study relations between algorithms, procedures, languages, and calculi as a part of 
metalogic.  
Here we are interested mostly in logical languages and calculi, as well as in 
algorithms of deduction and formal inference. Algorithms form a foundation for logic 
as logic as field has been developed with the aim to model and study human thinking 
and reasoning. A more realistic approach relates logic only to reasoning. Reasoning is 
an activity. Any activity is based on actions and operations organized in procedures 
and algorithms. That is why algorithms are necessary for the development of different 
logics, their study and application. 
Some think that algorithms are necessary only for syntax. However, semantics and 
pragmatics of any language and logic are also determined by corresponding 
algorithms given, as a rule, in a form of rules. 
In this work, we study only syntactic parts of logics, namely, deductive logical 
calculi. Semantic and pragmatic parts are studied elsewhere. A logical calculus in the 
metalogical setting is constructed as a two-tier hierarchical system. The first level 
gives a constructive representation of a logical and algorithmic languages used in 
logic. This level serves as the base for the second level, which consists of a syntactic, 
or deductive, logical calculus. To build a mathematical theory (metatheory) of logic, 
we utilize constructions from the theory of logical varieties (Burgin, 1995; 2004). 
Properties of constructive representations of logical languages (Section 2) and 
syntactic (deductive) logical calculi (Section 3) are studied. 
It is necessary to remark that the algorithmic level of logic studied here form a 
foundation (metalogic) not only for a huge diversity of logics studied in mathematics, 
logic and computer science, but also for universal logic introduced by Béziau (1994).  
 
Denotations and basic definitions:  
N is the set of all natural numbers. ω is the sequence of all natural numbers. 
∅ is the empty set. The logical symbol ∀ means “for any”. The logical symbol ∃ 
means “there exists”. 
If X is a set, then P(X) is the set of all subsets and Pfin(X) is the set of all finite 
subsets of X. 
If A is a system of algorithms and X is a set, then A(X) denotes the set of all 
elements that can be obtained by application of algorithms from A to the elements 
from X. For instance, if algorithms from A cannot be applied to the elements from X, 
then A(X) = ∅. 
A binary relation T between sets X and Y is a subset of the direct product X×Y. The 
set X is called the domain of T and denoted by D(T) and Y is called the codomain of T 
and denoted by CD(T). The range of the relation T is R(T) = { y ; ∃ x ∈ X ((x, y) ∈ 
T)}. The definability domain of the relation T is DD(T) = { x ; ∃ y ∈ Y ((x, y) ∈ T) }.  
An n-ary relation Q in a set X is a subset of the direct power Xn. 
The sequential composition T ° P of a binary relation T between sets X and Y and a 
binary relation P between sets Y and Z is a subset of the direct product X×Z defined as 
T ° P = { (a, c) where a ∈ X, c ∈ Z, and there is b ∈ Y such that (a, b) ∈ T and ( b, c) 
∈ P }. 
The closure T * of a binary relation T in a set X is the union of all sequential 
powers of the binary relation T, i.e., T* = ∪n=1∞ Tn. 
A function or total function from X to Y is a binary relation between sets X and Y 
that satisfies two following conditions: 1) there are no elements from X which are 
corresponded to more than one element from Y; and 2) some element from Y is 
corresponded to any element from X. Often total functions are also called everywhere 
defined functions. 
A partial function f from X to Y is a binary relation in which there are no elements 
from X which are corresponded to more than one element from Y. 
A word in an alphabet X is any finite string of elements from X. The symbol ε 
denotes the empty word. A formal language L in an alphabet X is any subset of the set 
X* of all words in the alphabet X. 
 
 
2. Languages as Calculi 
A definition of any logic starts with a definition of its language. A definition of 
any language starts with a definition of its alphabet. In the most general case, we 
assume that any set X may be an alphabet of a language. This assumption is made to 
allow us to use, for example, a vocabulary as an alphabet and thus, to build a 
conventional (natural or artificial like programming) language from words and not 
only from symbols/letters. A formal language is any set of words in some alphabet. 
However, to really know a language, we need to have its more concrete definition. 
There are three forms of language definitions/representations: demonstrative, 
descriptive and constructive definitions. 
Definition 2.1. A demonstrative definition of a language L represents this 
language as a list (collection) of words. 
When the language L is not very big, such presentation can be complete. For 
infinite languages and even very big languages, this form allows only representation 
of a part of the language. For instance, decimal representation of natural numbers can 
be given in form of a list: 1, 2, 3, … or 1, 2, 3, … , n, n + 1, … 
Definition 2.2. A descriptive definition of a language L gives some description of 
this language. 
A conventional description of a language in the theory of formal languages is 
representation of this language by a formula. 
Example 2.1. Any regular language is defined by a formula that is called a 
regular expression (Hopcroft, et al, 2001). 
Definition 2.3. A constructive definition of a language L gives an algorithm 
(rules or operations) to construct this language. 
In some cases, rules of language construction form a procedure. 
Here we are mostly interested in constructive definitions of languages. The 
reason for this is that in its most general form, a logical language is usually treated as 
a set of rules for constructing formulas for some logic. Logic works with these 
formulas, deducing some formulas from others, transforming formulas, and assigning 
truth values to formulas based on the rules of that logic. 
It is necessary to note that a constructive definition of a language L is a kind of a 
formal calculus (compare Definitions 2.4 and 3.1). 
According to the axiomatic theory of algorithms (Burgin, 2004a), construction of 
a language can be organized in three main types: 
1. Production/computation when an algorithm (system of algorithms) A 
(in general, potentially) builds all words from L and only such words. 
2. Acceptation (or separation) when an algorithm (system of algorithms) 
A (in general, potentially) accepts all words from L and only such words. 
3. Decision when an algorithm (system of algorithms) A (in general, 
potentially) accepts all words from L and rejects all other words. 
Thus, we have three types of constructive language definitions/representations: 
production, acceptation, and decision definitions.  
Example 2.2. Context-free languages are usually defined by derivation of their 
words utilizing rules from a context-free grammar G (Hopcroft, et al, 2001). The 
grammar G is an algorithm that is used for production of a context-free language as 
derivation is a kind of production. 
Example 2.3. Context-free languages are also defined by recursive inference 
utilizing rules from a context-free grammar G (Hopcroft, et al, 2001). In this case, the 
grammar G is an algorithm that is used for acceptation of a context-free language as 
recursive inference is a kind of production. 
Remark 2.1. To build languages, it is possible to use not only recursive inference 
and conventional derivation, but also inductive inference and inductive derivation, 
which are more powerful than recursive inference and conventional derivation 
(Burgin, 2005). 
Constructive definition gives a more detailed representation of a language than 
two other kinds of representation. It is formalized by means of the corresponding 
fundamental triad (Burgin, 2004b) described in the following definition. 
Definition 2.4. A language in a constructive representation/definition is a triad (a 
named set) of the form L = (X, R, L) where X is the alphabet, R is the set of 
constructive algorithms/rules and L is the set of words of the language L. 
Logical languages are a special kind of artificial languages developed 
intentionally within a culture. The typical feature of logical languages is that their 
structure Inner relations) and grammar (formation rules) are intended to express the 
logical information within linguistic expressions in clear and effective ways. 
Languages used in logic have, as a rule, constructive definitions in a form of 
production rules. Elements of logical languages are logical expressions or formulas. 
To emphasize that these formulas are constructed in a proper way, they are often 
called well-formed formulas. 
Example 2.4. Elements of the language of the classical propositional or sentential 
logic/calculus give a formal representation of propositions. Propositional variables are 
denoted by the capital letters of the Latin alphabet (A, B, C, etc.) or the small letters 
of the Greek alphabet (χ, φ, ψ, etc.). However, only one alphabet is usually used, but 
the two are not mixed. These letters are considered as atomic formulas and form a part 
of the alphabet of the language. Another part is formed by the symbols denoting the 
following connectives (or logical operators): negation denoted by ⎤ , logical “and” 
denoted by ∧, logical “or” denoted by ∨, implication denoted by →, and equivalence 
denoted by ↔. Logicians use other symbols to denote the same logical operators: 
negation is also denoted by ∼ , logical “and” is also denoted by & and ⋅, implication is 
also denoted by ⇒ and ⊃, and equivalence is also denoted by ≡ and ⇔. It is possible 
to use fewer operators (and thus, a smaller alphabet) by expressing some of these 
operators by mean of others, e.g., P → Q is equivalent to ⎤ P ∨  Q. For example, 
Church (1956) uses only one logical operator ⊃. In addition, the left and right 
parentheses, ( and ) or the left and right brackets [ and ] are included in the alphabet. 
Elements of the language LP of the classical propositional or sentential 
logic/calculus are called well-formed formulas (wffs). To build the set of well-formed 
formulas (wffs) the following rules are used: 
1. Letters of the alphabet are wffs from LP . 
2. If φ is a wff, then ⎤  φ is a wff from LP . 
3. If φ and ψ are wffs, then (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), (φ → ψ), and (φ ↔ ψ) are wffs from 
LP . 
These rules form the set of algorithms R that build the language LP of the 
classical propositional calculus. 
Example 2.5. Elements of the language LCPC of the classical predicate 
logic/calculus of the first order give a formal representation of binary properties. The 
predicate calculus language has a developed alphabet, making heavy use of symbolic 
notation. Lower-case letters a, b, c, ..., x, y, z, ... are used to denote individuals. 
Upper-case letters M, N, P, Q, R, ... are used to denote predicates.  
The alphabet LCPC of the language LCPC consists of the following parts: 
- A set F of function symbols (common examples include + and ⋅ );  
- A set P of predicate symbols (common examples include = and <);  
- A set C of logical connectives (usually, it is ⎤ , ∧, ∨, →, and ↔ ); 
- A set S of punctuation symbols (usually, examples include ( , ), : and ,); 
- A set Q of quantifiers (usuallly, they are ∀ and ∃ );  
- A set V of variables.  
Every function symbol, relation symbol, and connective is associated with an 
arity. Namely, an n-ary function has the form f: Xn → X and an n-ary function has the 
form P(x1 , x2 , …, xn ). The set of n-ary function symbols is denoted Fn , and the set of 
n-ary predicate symbols is denoted Pn . As a rule, 0-ary predicates and/or 0-ary 
functions are called constants. Another way to deal with constants is to include their 
names in the alphabet of the language. 
The language LCPC of the classical predicate calculus encompasses the language 
LP of the classical propositional calculus as propositions may be formed by 
juxtaposition of a predicate with an individual.  
Elements of the language LCPC of the classical predicate logic/calculus are also 
called well-formed formulas (wffs). To build the set of well-formed formulas (wffs) 
the following rules are used: 
1. Letters of the alphabet are wffs from LCPC . 
2. If φ is a wff, then ⎤ φ is a wff from LCPC . 
3. If φ and ψ are wffs, then (φ∧ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), (φ → ψ), and (φ ↔ ψ) are wffs 
from LCPC . 
4. If φ is a wff containing a free instance of variable x, then ∃xφ and ∀xφ 
are wffs from LCPC .  
Here a variable is free if it is not related to a quantifier. Consequently, 
transformation rule (4) makes any instance of x bound (that is, not free) in the 
formulas ∃xφ and ∀xφ . 
Example 2.6. Elements of the language LQA of the logic of questions and answers 
are questions and propositions (Belnap and Steel, 1976). Such logics are called 
 erotetic. A formalized language of an erotetic logic consists of two parts: assertoric 
and erotetic. The assertoric part of LQA is usually a first-order language. As far as the 
assertoric part of LQA is concerned, the concepts of term, well-formed formulas, 
variables, deduction, etc., are defined in a conventional way. Questions are the 
meaningful expressions of the erotetic part of LQA .  
Usually questions are separated into relevant classes. One way of classifying 
questions is in terms of the surface characteristics that give such classes as:  
1) yes/no questions (for example: “Is it now ten a.m.?”);  
2) item-specification questions (for example: “Who is a student?”);  
3) instruction-seeking questions (for example: “How to learn logic?”). 
Another way to classify questions is to take into account the nature of the 
answers. It gives us factual questions (for example: “What time is it now?”), 
normative questions (for example: “How it is necessary to drive when it is raining?”), 
and counter-factual questions (for example: “What might happen if we met a year 
ago?”). There are also special rules to build correct questions of the erotetic calculus. 
Thus, we can see that logicians use a diversity of logical languages and continue 
to invent new ones.  
Utilization of a logical language involves different operations with their elements. 
Such operations are performed according to definite rules (algorithms). The main 
operations are inference and substitution. Consequently, to build a logic, we need 
algorithms and it is natural to consider algorithmic languages, elements of which are 
texts/expressions that describe algorithms. Examples of algorithmic languages are the 
language of Turing machines, the language of finite automata or the language of 
inductive Turing machines (Burgin, 2005). All these algorithms can be used for 
inference. Although there is a difference between algorithms and their descriptions, as 
it is demonstrated in (Burgin, 2005), here we do not emphasize this difference and 
write, for simplicity, that algorithms belong to an algorithmic language. 
Algorithmic languages have the same types of representations as logical 
languages or any languages have, that is, there are three classes of language 
representations: representative, descriptive, and constructive representations. As in a 
general case, a constructive representation of an algorithmic language has the form of 
a fundamental triad. 
Systems of algorithms are often algebras or calculi because there are rules of 
composition of algorithms and of inference or derivation of algorithms in such a 
system. Examples of composition are sequential composition of two algorithms when 
the result of the first algorithm is given as the input for the second algorithms and 
parallel composition of two algorithms when the result of them composition algorithm 
consists of the results of both composed algorithms. An example of inference or 
derivation is given by the following reasoning: if in a monotone logical calculus C, 
there are inference algorithms r and q, then their sequential composition also belongs 
to this calculus. 
However, there is an essential difference between logical and algorithmic 
languages with respect to problems of logic. In the syntactic context, semantics of a 
logical language, which is a language of formulas, can be ignored. For instance, it is 
possible to treat propositions simply as letters or words. In contrast to this, semantics 
and, especially, the dynamic semantics of algorithmic languages is pivotal for logic. 
The reason is that to use algorithms, we need rules telling us how to apply these 
algorithms. Such rules, or sometimes they are called metarules, form the dynamic 
semantics of algorithmic languages. 
 
 
3. Logical Calculi 
According to the theory of logical varieties (Burgin, 1997), there are three kinds 
of logical calculi or simply, logics:  
1. Deductive or syntactic logical calculi. 
2. Functional or semantic logical calculi. 
3. Model or pragmatic logical calculi. 
Here we are mostly interested in syntactic logical calculi. In the majority of cases, 
such calculi are logical system used to prove true formulas (called theorems) and 
model argumentation and reasoning. Basic building blocks for syntactic logical 
calculi are formulas from logical languages, algorithms/rules of logical inference and 
formula transformations, and metarules that determine how to apply algorithms/rules 
of logical inference to elements from logical languages. 
Let L be a logical language or a language of well-formed formulas and R be an 
algorithmic language, procedural language or a language of rules of inference in L. 
All expressions from R are descriptions of algorithms that work with words from L. A 
standard example of L is the first order predicate language or any language of 
mathematical logics. But practically L may be any language: natural, mathematical, 
programming, of chemical formulas, etc. Any language in which it is possible to 
describe inference rules is an example of R. However, R usually contains not only 
inference rules but also transformation rules. 
Definition 3.1. A syntactic (deductive) logical calculus in the pair of languages 
(L, R) is a triad (a named set (Burgin, 2004b)) of the form C = (A, H, T) where H ⊆ R, 
A, T ⊆ L and T is obtained by applying algorithms/procedures/rules from H to 
elements from A. 
We consider two main types of deductive logical calculi: exact and relaxed (soft). 
In an exact deductive logical calculus C = (A, H, T), the system H consists of 
algorithms. 
In an relaxed deductive logical calculus C = (A, H, T), the system H consists of 
procedures some of which are not algorithms. 
Examples of exact deductive logical calculi are the syllogistic logic, classical 
propositional/sentential and predicate logics, intuitionistic logic, inductive logic, deontic 
logic, weak and strong paraconsistent logics, the logic of imperatives, different temporal 
logics, class logic, relevant logics, a variety of modal logics, the logic of values, the logic 
of norms, epistemic logic, erotetic logics, and so on and so forth.  
Examples of relaxed deductive logical calculi are dialectic logic, transcendental logic 
(Husserl, 1929), a logic of diagnosis (Tarasov, et al, 1989), and a logic of goal control 
(Ladenko and Tulchinsky, 1988). 
Usually, two cases of logical calculi are studied and constructed: monotonic and non-
monotonic. 
In the case of a monotonic logical calculus C, we have T = ∪n=1∞ Tn where T1 is 
equal to A , Tn is equal to H(Tn-1 ), and H(M) = { r(N); r ∈ H and N ⊆ M }. Another way 
to represent T is to consider the closure H* of H with respect to compositions of 
algorithms. Then T = H*(A).  
In the case of a non-monotonic logical calculus C, axioms are changing with time 
and we have A = { An ; n = 1, 2, 3, … } and T = { Tn ; n = 1, 2, 3, … } where An is the 
system of axioms at time (period) n and Tn is the system of axioms at the same time. 
Sometimes rules of inference H also change with time. 
When L is a logical language and H consists of rules of logical deduction, C is a 
deductive calculus. The same syntactic logical calculus can be considered in different 
pairs of languages (L, R) as the following simple property shows. 
Lemma 3.1. If L1 ⊆ L2 and R1 ⊆ R2 , then any syntactic logical calculus in (L1 , R1) is 
a syntactic logical calculus in (L2 , R2). 
 Usually we do not explicitly indicate in what pair of languages (L, R) a syntactic 
logical calculus is considered. 
Remark 3.1. It is possible to build/define a general syntactic calculus taking any 
language L and algorithmic language R with algorithms that work with words from L. 
Practically, L may be any language: natural, mathematical, programming, of chemical 
formulas, etc. For instance, when L contains descriptions and denotations of real/complex 
numbers and functions, while H consists of rules of differentiation/integration, C is the 
differentiation/integration calculus. Another example of a general syntactic calculus is 
any universal algebra (e.g., a group, ring or linear algebra over a field of real numbers). 
One more example of a general syntactic calculus is a productive representation of a 
language, i.e., a language is usually represented as a calculus (cf., Definition 2.4). 
Remark 3.2. In what follows, it is always assumed that H forms a cumulative 
system, i.e., algorithms from H only add formulas or change them but never exclude 
formulas. At the same time, it is possible to consider both inclusive and exclusive 
algorithms. This brings us to nonmonotonous calculi, which formalize nonmonotonous 
reasoning and nonmonotonous logics. 
Definition 3.2.  a) A is called the axiom system (base or generating system if C is not 
a logical calculus) of the calculus C.  
b) H is called the system of inference rules of the calculus C.  
c) T is called the body (the set of theorems or set of the deducible expressions) of the 
calculus C. It is constructed by applying algorithms from H to expressions from A.  
Components of a syntactic calculus C = (A, H, T) are denoted as follows: A = A(C), 
H = H(C), and T = T(C). 
It is possible that the set of axioms A is empty or countably infinite. In the second 
case, this set is represented by axiom schemata, which contain variables for elements 
from the corresponding language L or/and from the alphabet of this language. 
Example 3.1. Let us consider the classical propositional or sentential logic/calculus. 
Many systems of propositional calculus have been devised to achieve consistency, 
completeness, and independence of axioms. All these systems are logically equivalent in 
the sense of Definition 3.4a. Thus, it is more correct to call these systems not the same 
calculus but logically equivalent representations of the classical propositional or 
sentential logic/calculus. 
For instance, Kleene (2002) suggests the following list of axioms (axiom schemas) of 
the classical propositional calculus:  
φ → (χ → φ)                                                                   (1) 
(φ → (χ → ψ)) → ((φ → χ) → (φ → ψ))                              (2) 
φ → (χ → (φ ∧ χ))                                                                       (3) 
φ → φ ∨ χ                                                                                   (4) 
χ → φ ∨ χ                                                                                    (5) 
φ ∧ χ → φ                                                                                   (6) 
φ ∧ χ → χ                                                                                     (7) 
(φ → ψ) → ((χ → ψ) → (φ ∨ χ → ψ))                                           (8) 
(φ → χ) → ((φ → ⎤ χ) → ¬ φ)                                                        (9) 
⎤  ⎤  φ → φ                                                                                    (10) 
 
Usually the system of inference rules has only one rule called modus ponens: 
φ , φ → ψ ├ ψ  
or the natural/programming language notation 
If  φ and φ → ψ, then ψ. 
Other rules are derived from modus ponens and then used in formal proofs to make 
proofs shorter and more understandable. These rules serve to directly introduce or 
eliminate connectives, e.g., “If φ and χ, then φ ∧ χ “ ( or  φ , χ ├ φ ∧ χ ) or “If φ, then φ 
∨ χ “ ( or   φ├ φ ∨ χ ). 
A standard transformation rule is substitution. This rule is necessary because axiom 
schemas demand substitution to become axioms and be applied. Namely, formulas (1) – 
(10) are axioms when the system of inference rules includes the substitution rule (cf. 
Example 3.2) and are axiom schemas when the system of inference rules has only Modus 
Ponens (Smullyan, 1962). 
Example 3.2. There are other representations of the classical propositional 
logic/calculus. Let us consider some of them. 
Thus, Church (2002) suggests two logically equivalent representations P1 and P2 for 
the classical propositional calculus. The alphabet of P1 contains: one symbol of the 
logical operator ⊃, two punctuation symbols [ and ] , a constant symbol f, and a countable 
set of variables q, p, s, … . 
The system P1 has the following list of axiom schemata:  
[p ⊃ [q ⊃ p]]                                                                   (1) 
[[s ⊃ [p ⊃ q]] ⊃ [[s ⊃ p] ⊃ [s ⊃ q]]]                              (2) 
[[[p ⊃ f] ⊃ f ] ⊃ p]                                                          (3) 
The system of inference rules of P1 contains two elements: 
1. Modus ponens:  p , p → q imply q  
2. Substitution Rule: p implies Sxq p where Sxq denotes the substitution of a 
variable x by a formula q. 
The alphabet of P2 contains: two symbols of logical operators ⊃ and ∼, two 
punctuation symbols [ and ] , and a countable set of variables q, p, s, … . 
The system P2 has the following list of axiom schemata:  
[p ⊃ [q ⊃ p]]                                                                   (1) 
[[s ⊃ [p ⊃ q]] ⊃ [[s ⊃ p] ⊃ [s ⊃ q]]]                              (2) 
[[∼ p ⊃ ∼q] ⊃ [q ⊃ p]]                                                   (3) 
The system of inference rules of P2 is the same as the system of inference rules of P1 
: 
1. Modus ponens:  p , p → q imply q  
2. Substitution Rule: p implies Sxq p where Sxq denotes the substitution of a 
variable x by a formula q. 
Example 3.3. Let us consider the classical first-order predicate logic/calculus. 
Various systems of first-order predicate calculus have been devised to achieve 
consistency, flexibility, and independence of axioms. All these systems are logically 
equivalent in the sense of Definition 3.4a. 
Shoenfield (2001) suggests the following list of axiom schemata of the classical first-
order predicate calculus:  
Propositional Axiom:     φ ∨ ⎤ φ 
Identity Axiom:     x = x  
Substitution Axiom:     φx[a] → ∃x φ  
Equality Axioms:   a)  If f is a symbol of an n-ary function from F, then  
x1 = y1 ∧ x2 = y2 , … , xn = yn → f(x1 , x2 , …, xn ) = f(y1, y2, … , yn); 
b) If f is a symbol of an n-ary predicate from P, then  
x1 = y1 ∧ x2 = y2 , … , xn = yn → p(x1 , x2 , …, xn ) = p(y1, y2, … , yn) 
The system of inference rules of the classical first-order predicate calculus contains 
two elements: 
Extension rule: φ implies φ ∨ ψ 
Cancellation rule: φ ∨ φ implies φ  
Associative rule: (φ ∨ ψ) ∨ χ = φ ∨ (ψ ∨ χ)  
Cut rule: (φ ∨ ψ) and (⎤ φ ∨ χ) imply (ψ ∨ χ) 
∃-introduction rule: φ → ψ implies ∃x φ → ψ if x is not a free variable in ψ. 
 
Example 3.4. Syntactic logical calculi provide functional formalization to the notion 
of a formal theory (Smullyan, 1962). In turn, a formal theory formalizes some source 
theory from a scientific discipline (e.g., mathematics, physics or economics). In order to 
specify a formal theory, one first chooses a small collection of predicates, functions and 
relations, which are regarded as basic for a given field of study (groups, topological 
spaces or geometry). The chosen predicates delimit the scope of the formal theory. These 
predicates are the primitives of the theory and together with logical and punctuation 
symbols (such as the symbols ( or , ) form the alphabet of the theory (calculus) language. 
The language consists of expressions (functions, relations, and predicates) defined in 
terms of the primitives. Using them, one writes down certain predicates that are regarded 
as basic or self-evident within the given field of study. These predicates are the axioms of 
the theory. It is crucial to make all of underlying assumptions of the source theory 
explicit as axioms. Often this is not a simple task. One can compare formalization of the 
Euclidean geometry given by Euclid and Hilbert (Hilbert, 1930). Using logical 
rules/algorithms of inference (usually, it is only Modus Ponens and substitution rule) 
theorems of the theory are deduced from the axioms. As a result, a formal theory is this 
structure of theory language, axioms, and theorems. 
The process of codifying a scientific discipline by means of primitives and axioms in 
the predicate calculus is known as formalization. The key issue here is the choice of 
primitives and axioms. They can be chosen arbitrarily but it is better to exercise a certain 
aesthetic touch and use the following principles: it must not be too many axioms; they 
must be basic and self-evident from the discipline’s point of view; and they must account 
for the largest possible number of other concepts and facts. 
In all given examples, the system H consists only of simple rules such as modus 
ponens and substitution. Thus it is possible to ask a question why in the definition of a 
calculus, it is necessary to consider algorithms and not only of simple rules such as 
modus ponens and substitution. The following example explains such a necessity. 
Example 3.5. Applications of logic, such as program verification, demand utilization 
of decidable inference rules. In logic/calculus with validation LV, all inference rules are 
decidable. In this calculus, H contains a variety of different algorithms in addition to 
inference rules. In particular, we have a decidable modus ponens: 
If p → q and it is validated that p is true, then q is true. 
To validate that a proposition is true may have different meanings. It can mean: 
a) To prove that p is true in the classical sense. 
b) To prove that p is true with ordinal induction. 
c) To test that p is true. 
In such a system, the pair of propositions p → q and p do not imply q if there is no 
algorithms in H to check p. If validation is temporary, i.e., it true only for some time, then 
the logic/calculus with validation LV is nonmonotonic. Examples from mathematics of 
such temporary validation are given in the book of Lakatos (1976). 
Other kinds of inference rules (algorithms) are used in fuzzy logics (Zadeh, 1975; 
Zimmermann, 1997). 
Proposition 3.1.  If C = (A, H, T) and D = (B, K, Q) are syntactic logical calculi in 
(L, R), A ⊆ B, and H ⊆ K, then T ⊆ Q. 
Let us assume that the algorithmic language R contains an identity algorithm E, for 
which E(w) = w for any expression w from L. 
Lemma 3.2. Any subset Q of L is the body of some syntactic logical calculus C = (A, 
H, Q). 
This result shows that the concept of a syntactic logical calculus is very general and 
to get models better suited to tasks of logic, it is necessary to have some restrictions on 
those algorithms that are used in logical calculi. 
Lemma 3.3. For any syntactic logical calculus C = (A, H, T), we have A ⊆ T. 
Definition 3.3.  If A = L, then a syntactic logical calculus C = (L, H, T) is called a 
free syntactic logical calculus or a formal deduction system. 
Let us assume that H contains an identity algorithm E. 
Corollary 3.1. The body of a free syntactic logical calculus C = (L, H, T) is equal to 
L. 
Remark 3.3. There are free syntactic logical calculi in which the language L is 
infinite, but the body is finite. For instance, we can take the language of the classical 
propositional calculus as L and such rules of classical deduction that work only with 
formulas the length of which is less than 1000 as set of inference rules H. In this case, the 
body T of the calculus C = (L, H, T) is finite. 
 
Let L1 and L2 be logical languages, R1 and R2 be algorithmic languages with 
algorithms that work with words from L1 and L2, correspondingly, and f: L1 → L2 is a 
one-to-one mapping (bijection) of L1 onto L2. 
Definition 3.4. a) Two syntactic logical calculi C = (A, H, T) in (L1 , R1) and D = (B, 
K, Q) in (L2 , R2) are called logically (or semantically) equivalent with respect to f if Q = 
f(T). This relation is denoted by C ~flg D. 
b) Two syntactic logical calculi C = (A, H, T) in (L, R) and D = (B, K, Q) in (L, R) are 
called logically (or semantically) equivalent if T = Q. It is denoted by C ~lg D. 
Proposition 3.2. Relation ~flg is an equivalence relation if and only if L1 = L2 and f is 
the identity mapping. 
Indeed, when f is not the identity mapping, we have f ≠ g = f -1 and thus, the relation 
C ~flg D does not imply the relation C ~glg D. Consequently, ~flg is not reflexive and thus, 
not an equivalence relation. 
Sufficiency of conditions in Proposition 3.2 follows from Definition 3.4. 
Corollary 3.2. Relation ~lg is an equivalence relation. 
 
Axioms (or their schemata) and rules of inference define a proof theory. Such proof 
theories are usually considered equivalent when the corresponding calculi are logically 
equivalent. For instance, various equivalent proof theories of propositional calculus have 
been constructed (cf. Examples 3.1 and 3.2). 
Definition 3.5. a) Two syntactic logical calculi C = (A, H, T) in (L1 , R1) and D = (B, 
K, Q) in (L2 , R2) are called algorithmically (or inferentially) equivalent with respect to f 
if B = f(A) and Q = f(T). It is denoted by C ~falg D. 
b) Two syntactic logical calculi C = (A, H, T) in (L, R) and D = (B, K, Q) in (L, R) are 
called algorithmically (or inferentially) equivalent if T = Q and A = B. It is denoted by C 
~alg D. 
Algorithmically equivalent logical calculi are usually considered as different 
axiomatizations of the same logic. 
Proposition 3.3. Relation ~falg is an equivalence relation if and only if L1 = L2 and f is 
the identity mapping. 
Corollary 3.3. Relation ~alg is an equivalence relation. 
Lemma 3.4. Algorithmic equivalence (with respect to f) implies logical equivalence 
(with respect to f). 
Syntactic logical calculi can be named by classes of algorithms to which their 
inference rules belong. For instance, there are finite automaton calculi, recursive calculi, 
and superrecursive calculi. 
Proposition 3.4. If the body T of a syntactic logical calculus C = (A, H, T) is finite, 
then C is logically equivalent to a nondeterministic finite automaton calculus.    
Proof. Let us consider a syntactic logical calculus C = (A, H, T) with the finite set T 
of theorems. Taking this finite set T of formulas and choosing some formula w from T, it 
is possible to build a deterministic finite automaton Aw with ε-transition that given the 
empty word ε as its input, computes w and nothing else. When some other symbol is 
given to Aw, its output is ε. 
The finite automaton AT , which computes the set T, contains all automata Aw with w 
∈ T. It is possible because there are only finite number of such automata Aw. The 
automaton AT has the start state q0 that is different from the start states of all Aw and 
works according to the following rules. 
With the empty input, the automaton AT makes a transition to the start state q0w of 
one of the automata Aw . As AT is a nondeterministic automaton, it has a possibility to 
make a transition from q0 to any of the states q0w . After this transition, the automaton Aw 
computes the formula w, which is produced as the output of AT . In such a way, the 
automaton AT computes (deduces) all elements from T. 
When some other symbol is given to AT , it gives no output as there are no transition 
from q0 beside ε-transitions. Consequently, if we take K = { AT }, we obtain a 
nondeterministic finite automaton calculus C0 = (A, K, T), which is algorithmically and 
logically equivalent to C = (A, H, T). 
Proposition is proved. 
Remark 3.4. It is possible to prove by the same technique that C = (A, H, T) is 
algorithmically and logically equivalent to a deterministic finite automaton with ε-
transitions syntactic calculus. 
Remark 3.5. If ε-transitions are not permitted, then the result of Proposition 3.4 is 
not true for deterministic finite automaton syntactic calculi. For example, when the set of 
axioms A is empty, the set of theorems a deterministic finite automaton syntactic calculus 
is also empty. 
Definition 3.6.  Two syntactic logical calculi C = (A, H, T) and D = (B, K, Q) are 
called axiomatically (or generatively) equivalent if T = Q and H = K. It is denoted by C 
~ax D. 
Axiomatic equivalence of calculi informally means that given the same inference 
rules/algorithms, different axiom systems produce the same set of theorems. 
Definitions imply the following results. 
Lemma 3.5. The relation ~ax is an equivalence relation. 
Lemma 3.6. Axiomatic equivalence implies logical equivalence. 
Lemma 3.7. Two syntactic logical calculi C = (A, H, T) and D = (B, K, Q) are 
axiomatically and inferentially equivalent if and only if they coincide.  
Let us consider some specific classes of syntactic logical calculi. 
Definition 3.7.  A syntactic calculus C = (A, H, T) is called:  
(1) constructing if by means of the algorithms (rules) from H new constructions are 
elaborated; 
(2) transforming if by means of the algorithms (rules) from  H expressions from L 
are only transformed; 
(3) closed with respect to A if all elements from A are used for the construction of the 
set T; 
(4) closed with respect to H  if  all algorithms from H are used for the construction of 
the set T; 
(5) basically closed if any algorithm from  H  may  be  applied to any set of 
expressions from A; 
(6) transitively  closed  if  any  sequential  composition  of algorithms from H is 
admissible; 
(7) completely closed if it is closed with  respect  to A and H and is transitively 
closed; 
(8) admissible if  T ≠ L, i.e., the set of theorem does not coincide with the whole 
language; 
(9) consistent with a subset P of the language L if T ∩ P = ∅ where ∅ is an empty 
set; 
(10) complete with respect to a set F of algorithms/rules from R and a subset Q of L 
if the set Q can be constructed from T by means of F, i.e. Q ⊆ F(T); 
(11) consistent if T does not include contradictory (false) expressions from L (for 
example, expressions having the form a & ⎤ a when L contains standard logical 
connectives); 
(12) complete with respect to a mapping f: L → L if for any a ∈ L we have a ∈ T or 
f(a) ∈ T. 
For example, when L is a logical language with negation ⎤  and we take f(a) = ⎤ a then 
completeness with respect to such f is the conventional completeness of a logical 
calculus. If we take any classical logical calculus C = (A, H, T) and P consists of some 
expressions having the form a&⎤ a, then consistency with P is equivalent to conventional 
definitions of consistency. From the point of view of classical logic, we are compelled to 
derive any conclusion from inconsistent premises. Consequently, any admissible classical 
calculus is consistent. 
At the same time, when we have an admissible but inconsistent knowledge system, 
accumulating reports of empirical observations can help in deciding in favor of one 
alternative over another, allowing one to restore consistency in many cases. However, 
practical situations show that even without restoring consistency, an inconsistent system 
can still produce useful information. Examples of admissible but not necessarily 
consistent syntactic logical calculi are given by different paraconsistent logics (da Costa, 
1974; Arruda, 1980). Relevant logics (Anderson and Belnap, 1975) give another class of 
examples of admissible but possibly inconsistent syntactic logical calculi. In these logics, 
efficient proof procedures infer only "relevant" conclusions with varying degrees of 
accessibility, as stated by the criteria of non-classical relevant entailment.  
Many of properties from Definition 3.7 are the same for logically equivalent calculi. 
Proposition 3.5. If C = (A, H, T) is an admissible (consistent with a subset P of the 
language L, complete with respect to a set F of algorithms/rules from R and a subset Q of 
L, consistent, complete with respect to a mapping f: L → L ) syntactic logical calculus 
and a syntactic logical calculus B = (B, K, Q) is logically equivalent to C, then B is an 
admissible (consistent with a subset P of the language L, complete with respect to a set F 
of algorithms/rules from R and a subset Q of L, consistent, complete with respect to a 
mapping f: L → L, respectively) syntactic logical calculus. 
Let us assume that all calculi are completely closed.  
Proposition 3.6. a) If T ⊆ L, H ⊆ R and H(T) = T, then T is the body of some 
transitively closed calculus with the system of inference rules H. b) If T is the body of a 
transitively closed calculus C = (A, H, T) and A ⊆ T, then H(T) = T. 
 Let H includes an algorithm that defines the identity function on L. Then Proposition 
3.2 implies the following results. 
Corollary 3.4. If H(T) ⊆ T, then T is the body of some transitively closed calculus 
with the inference rules H. 
 Corollary 3.5. The intersection of any set of bodies of transitively closed calculi is 
the body of some transitively closed calculus. 
 Any ordinary logical calculus will be completely closed if to the inference rules we 
add the identity operator on L.  
Proposition 3.7. A calculus C = (A, H, T) is transitively closed if and only if H(T) ⊆ 
T. 
 Let P ⊆ L and the whole L may be constructed by applying algorithms from H to an 
arbitrary element p from P.  
Proposition 3.8. A transitively closed calculus C = (A, H, T) is admissible if and 
only if it is consistent with P. 
 
Usually relations of some arity are considered in a set as subsets of direct powers of 
this set (cf. Denotations and Basic Definitions). In logic, we need a more general kind of 
relations defined between subsets of formulas and individual formulas. Let X be a set. 
Then (Béziau, 1994), a subset R of the direct product P(X) × X is called an abstract logic 
or logical structure. 
The relation R is an abstract form of a consequence, or inference, relation in X. For 
instance, the inference relation ├ in conventional logic is derived from the consequence 
relation (denoted by ╟ ) of this logic. This consequence relation is called operational. 
The consequence relation is a subset of the inference relation. Application of one 
deduction rule, such as modus ponens, gives the consequence relation. Consecutive 
application of several deduction rules gives the inference relation. However, when the set 
of algorithms H is closed under sequential composition, inference and consequence 
relations coincide. Thus, the inference relation is a kind of the consequence relation. 
Besides, the operational consequence relation ╟ there are other types of 
consequence relations. For instance, there is the model consequence relation ⊨ when 
Φ╟ ψ if ψ is true in all models in which Φ is true. 
In non-monotonic logics, the operational consequence relation ⎥∼ called a 
conditional assertion is used (Kraus, et al, 1990). This relation Φ⎥∼ ψ is interpreted as if 
Φ, normally ψ, or ψ is a plausible consequence of Φ. 
The consequence relation in an abstract logic determines a formal logical syntax. 
Logical syntax is not the same as the syntax of a logical language. The syntax or, more 
exactly, linguistic syntax of a logical language is defined/given by the rules of well-
formed formulas construction. 
Definition 3.8. A consequence relation ╟ [in a calculus C = (A, H, T) ] is defined by 
the inference system H in the following way: for any system of formulas Φ and formula 
ψ, we have Φ╟ ψ if ψ∈ H(Φ)  [Φ╟C ψ if ψ∈ H(A ∪ Φ ) ].  
In this case, H is called an operational semantics for the consequence relation ╟ .  
Definition 3.9. A inference relation├ [in a calculus C = (A, H, T) ] is defined by the 
inference system H in the following way: for any system of formulas Φ and formula ψ, 
we have Φ├ ψ if ψ∈ H*(Φ)  [Φ├C ψ if ψ∈ H*(A ∪ Φ ) ].  
 An operational semantics for the consequence relation ╟C is called an operational 
semantics for the logical calculus C. The operational semantics for the logical calculus C 
can consists of algorithms of a definite type, e.g., recursive algorithms or inductive 
algorithms (Burgin, 2005). The type of algorithms determines the type of operational 
semantics. For example, all conventional logics have a recursive operational semantics. 
Inductive operational semantics allows one to use inductive Turing machines for logical 
inference.  
Usually, logic is built from a logical calculus by adding truth (functional) and/or 
model (representational) semantics. The classical truth semantics is a mapping of all well-
formed formulas of a logical language L into the set {True, False} or {T, F} or {1, 0}. It 
is always supposed all axioms, i.e., elements from the set A, are true. The truth semantics 
of a fuzzy logic is a mapping of all well-formed formulas of a logical language L into the 
set [0, 1]. The truth semantics of an intuitionistic logic is a mapping of all well-formed 
formulas of a logical language L into the set {True, False, Unknown}. 
In this context, the first Gödel incompleteness theorem has the following form. 
Theorem 3.1. The truth semantics of a system that contains the formal arithmetic 
cannot have (be defined by) a recursive operational semantics. 
A logical calculus with an inductive operational semantics is more powerful than a 
logical calculus with a recursive operational semantics and the same system of axioms. 
For instance, the main result from (Burgin, 2003) implies the following result. 
Theorem 3.2. The truth semantics of the formal arithmetic can have (be defined by) 
an inductive operational semantics. 
Usually each step of logical inference or deduction involves only a finite number of 
formulas. Thus, it is more reasonable to consider only finitely based abstract logics. 
Definition 3.10. A subset R of the direct product Pfin(X) × X is called a finitely based 
abstract logic or logical structure. 
Lemma 3.8. It is possible to represent any finitely based inference relation R in X as 
a union of n-ary relations in X, i.e., R ≅ ∪n=1∞ Rn where ({x1 , x2 , … , xk }, z) ∈ R if and 
only if (x1 , x2 , … , xk , z) ∈ Rk+1 for all k = 0, 1, 2, … , n , … . 
In logic, inference relations have additional properties. For instance, Kraus, et al, 
(1990) write, “Reflexivity (i.e., p → p) seems to be satisfied universally by any kind of 
reasoning based on notion of consequence.” However there are logics in which this is not 
true. 
Example 3.6. Let us consider a prediction logic/calculus PV. Its goal is to deduce 
future from the past and/or present. In this context, knowing that some 
proposition/predicate p has been true even for a long time, we cannot assert that p will be 
true tomorrow. 
The most notable example of such a situation is given by the famous model of a true 
empirical proposition that is attributed to Aristotle: 
All swans are white. 
Europeans had believed in this until they came to Australia where they found black 
swans and disproved this statement. 
Many scientific laws have found themselves in a similar situation. For instance, 
Newton’s laws were considered as absolute truth for centuries. However, relativity theory 
and quantum mechanics demonstrated limitations of these laws. A similar story happened 
to the famous Church-Turing Thesis, which one of the cornerstones of the contemporary 
computer science. For a long time, this Thesis was considered as absolute truth. Only 
recently with the advent of superrecursive algorithms, it was refuted (Burgin, 2005).  
Definition 3.11. A formal consequence/inference relation R in X is called m-bounded 
if R ≅ ∪n=1m Rn . 
Definition 3.12. A formal consequence/inference relation R in X is called 
functionally m-bounded if the range Rg(R ) = ∪n=1m Rg(Qn ) where each Qn is an n-ary 
relation in X for n = 1, 2, … , m. 
Informally, functional m-boundedness means that to get the range of R, we need only 
m-ary relations and relations of smaller arity. The range is important because if R is an 
inference relation in some actual logic, its range consists of all theorems of this logic. 
Definition 3.13. A formal consequence/inference relation R in X is called m-strict if 
R ≅ Rm . 
Definition 3.14. A formal consequence/inference relation R in X is called 
functionally m-strict if Rg(R ) = Rg(Qm ) where Qm is an m-ary relation. 
 
Let H be a system of (inference) algorithms/rules in a logical language L. 
Lemma 3.9. If the system H is closed with respect to the sequential composition of 
algorithms, then ├ = ╟. 
Theorem 3.3. For any syntactic logical calculus C = (A, H, T), we have T = { ϕ ∈ L; 
A ├C ϕ }. 
It is useful to specify the concept of a logical structure, making it closer to concrete 
logics and logical calculi.  
Let L be an arbitrary language and A and T be subsets of L. 
Definition 3.16. An abstract universal logical calculus U in a set X with a base A and 
inference relation F is a triad U = (A, F, T) such that F ⊆ P(X) × X and T = F(A) . 
Let L be a logical language and A and T be subsets of L. 
Definition 3.17. A formal universal logical calculus is an abstract universal logical 
calculus in a logical language L. 
Theorem 3.4. The consequence relation ╟C in C is functionally m-bounded in C if 
and only if for any pair ({x1 , x2 , … , xk }, x ) from ╟C with k > m there is a set {x1 , x2 , 
… , xn } of element z in L such that ({x1 , x2 , … , xn }, x ) also belongs to ╟C and n < m + 
1. 
  
Corollary 3.3. The consequence relation ╟C in C is functionally 2-bounded in C if 
and only if for any pair ({x1 , x2 , … , xk }, x ) from ╟C there is an element z in L such 
that (z, x) also belongs to ╟C . 
 
Theorem 3.5. The inference relation ├C  in L with respect to C is functionally m-
bounded in C if and only if for any pair ({x1 , x2 , … , xk }, x ) from ├C  with k > m there 
is a set {x1 , x2 , … , xn } of element z in L such that ({x1 , x2 , … , xn }, x ) also belongs to 
├C  and n < m + 1. 
 
Corollary 3.3. The inference relation ├C in L with respect to C is functionally 2-
bounded in C if and only if for any pair ({x1 , x2 , … , xk }, x ) from ├C there is an 
element z in L such that (z, x) also belongs to ├C . 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
Basic properties of such fundamental logical systems as syntactic logical calculi have 
been explored. Relations between axiom systems (such as axiomatic equivalence), 
systems of inference rules/algorithms (such as algorithmic equivalence), and different 
calculi ((such as logical equivalence) have been described. The inherent structure of 
logical calculus has been explicated and formalized as the first in the development of 
metalogic. This approach allows one to study how logical languages are built and what is 
a general schema of theorem derivation from axioms in a logical calculus.  
There are several directions for future research. It would be interesting to study the 
inner structure of the set of theorems. It is possible to stratify this set by complexity of 
theorem inference, time of inference or by other relations between theorems. Inference 
complexity can be estimated by the length of inference, by the maximal length of 
formulas utilized in the inference procedure or by the complexity of algorithms used for 
inference. 
Another important direction is to study other types of calculi, that is, model and 
functional calculi, from an algorithmic perspective. 
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